Abstract: Small island developing states (SIDS) has been inserted into much of the inter-governmental discourse in areas such as climate change, environmental protection, vulnerabilities and socio-economic development. However, concerns remain about the group's legitimacy, leading to questions about the attainability of its geopolitical objectives. These concerns emanate in part, from the lack of explicit and defined classification criteria for the group. This paper represents an attempt at resolving this problem and adds to the work on this area. Its main contribution is an easily implemented statistical procedure that endogenously generates these criteria for conceptually relevant indicators. This procedure accords each self-identified SIDS a presumption of 'innocence' -only being found 'guilty of pretence' if it violates the selection criteria that the self-identified group in a statistical methodology created. This is applied to a set of indicators based on relevant concepts to propose strict and relaxed definitions of SIDS.
Motivation
The brokerage of geo-political influence and hegemony necessitates strategic alliances among states. This is evident throughout history with recent manifestations in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the G8 and the G10. Arguably the best known of these alliances have been those (such as those referenced previously) whose constituent members individually exercise significant global economic and political influence. In such cases, these alliances/organisations are means of consolidating and preserving relative positions against common and usually emerging hegemonic threats (economic, political or otherwise). The lesser known of these geo-political alliances are usually comprised of countries that lack both influence and power in global political, economic or military arenas. They at times, face near existential struggles to get their collective voice heard on topics of strategic importance to them. In the authors' opinion the countries that comprise the various organisations representing small island developing states (SIDS) are faced with these challenges.
As a geopolitical construct in international relations and diplomacy, SIDS has been inserted into much of the inter-governmental discourse in areas such as climate change including global sea level rise, biodiversity loss and socio-economic development. Within the UN system, SIDS is represented by The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Its membership (including observers) is comprised of 44 coastal states. According to information obtained from its website the alliance does not have: a formal charter; a regular budget; nor a secretariat -instead it operates out of its chairperson's mission (to the UN).
Notwithstanding SIDS' acceptance in the UN system, the "UN never established criteria to determine an official list of SIDS" [Boto and Biasca, (2012), p.6] . The absence of a definition has led some to question the group's legitimacy and the attainability of much of its geopolitical objectives. The title of the UNCTAD, 2004 publication -"Is a special treatment of SIDS possible?" is telling in this regard.
This 'definition problem' and the closely related issue of legitimacy remain at the core of much of the scepticism and lack of concrete action where SIDS is concerned (Hein, 2004; Encontre, 2004) . Furthermore, as "fuzziness and lack of clarity offer an easy pretext for inaction" [Hein, (2004), p.17] , this question of definition, we submit, ought to be an issue of primacy for the group.
In view of the definitional challenge, this paper represents an attempt at remedying this deficiency. It proposes an approach to establishing definitional criteria for SIDS. It further postulate strict and relaxed definitions of SIDS based on statistically grounded demarcation points for key indicators of: 1 what we term 'geo-economic status' 2 what we term 'geo-impact status'.
The remainder of the paper is structured in seven parts. Section 2 briefly outlines the evolution of the SIDS concept. Section 3 provides a cursory review of the challenges and vulnerabilities facing SIDS that sometimes appear to be used as justification for the group existence. Section 4 examines the question of the group's legitimacy. Section 5 presents the proposed approach to defining SIDS. Section 6 presents the results of this proposed approach. Section 7 proposes a strict and relaxed definitions SIDS based on the results in the previous section. Section 8 concludes the paper.
The evolution of SIDS
Since the 1970s global organisations -the United Nations and World Bank in particular begun categorising countries according to various criteria to support their development programmes and outreach. The most popular classification is that of developed and developing countries. Heterogeneity in economic, environmental and social contexts (especially among countries classified as developing) however spawned further attempts at (sub) classification using other means. Classification were done based on the level of development by the World Bank, and this has emerged with sub categories of 'least developed countries', 'more developed countries' and 'low income countries'. Many small countries found it challenging to subscribe to these distinctions and disaggregation, due to their small yet complex interconnection between environmental and economic stability components.
This challenge, witnessed the further categorisation using geographical characteristics, resulted in two additional groups of countries within the group of developing countries. These were the 'land locked countries' and the 'island developing countries'. However, Island developing countries category continued to attract discussions as smaller islands felt that their issues were diluted by larger islands realities. In 1992, the phasing out of the island developing countries commenced and by 1994, the United Nations initiated a new categorisation called 'SIDS' to recognise the specific development challenges faced by smaller island states.
Challenges, disadvantages and vulnerabilities
SIDS by virtue of their size and island geography is confronted with special vulnerabilities that impact on their developmental prospects. The concomitant developmental challenges of small size have been recognised by economists from at least as early as the 1960s. According to Demas (1965) , small states are more likely to be enclave economies, where long term growth are driven largely by developments in relatively few export commodities. Even in the midst of secular economic expansions (led by export growth in the enclave sector), these economies are less likely to experience the kind of structural transformation that allows a continued capacity to adapt and to apply innovations.
In addition to being enclave economies, Armstrong and Read (2003) consistent with Demas, explain how domestic activity in small economies is less likely to be characterised by competitive market structures because domestic demand is insufficient to achieve critical mass to make it feasible for a large number of firms to reach the minimum scale necessary for efficient output. Their small domestic markets, therefore limits possibilities for competition because of the small number of incumbent firms. Referring to their small domestic market Armstrong and Read (2003, p.104) states: "This creates a natural barrier to entry which also affects services such as distribution and retailing. It also exposes the domestic market of small states to the adverse effects of monopoly or oligopoly, with additional upward effects on domestic prices, including essential inputs. The cost of living in small states can therefore be expected to be relatively high because of scale and competition effects as well as the limits on the range of goods and services available. These effects will be greater in more isolated small states because of the impact of transportation costs." Briguglio (1995) also point to other vulnerabilities associated with small size. These include inter alia: limited natural resource endowments and low interindustry linkages; limited scope for import substitution; restricted ability to influence domestic prices; high per unit cost of production due limited scope for specialisation and other means of exploiting economies of scale.
Insularity -a feature of all islands -and remoteness a feature of some lead to: high per unit transportation cost; uncertainties of supply; and a tendency to maintain relatively high levels of inventories, further increasing production cost (Briguglio, 1995) . In addition, SIDS seems to be particularly vulnerable to natural hazards. According to the disaster risk index constructed by Peduzzi et al. (2009) SIDS are more than proportionately represented amongst the countries most vulnerable to natural hazards, as seven of the 25 highest risk countries (of a total of 219 countries) are SIDS.
Definition and legitimacy challenges
In their reader to the ACP-EU Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) briefing no. 27 Boto and Biasca (2012, p.27) states:
"The absence of a definition of the SIDS category has been the most fundamental reason for which countries that claimed to fall in that category were not able to gain special treatment on grounds of 'small islandness'."
They also referred to the fact that loose or interchangeable use (in various fora) of the terms SIDS; small economies; small and vulnerable economies or structurally weak, vulnerable, and small economies adds to the lack of clarity.
Whether as a consequence of, or a contributor to this definitional problem, the existence of several list of SIDS further aggravates the issue. The literatures revealed the existence of several list of SIDS -at least six according to Fialho and van Bergeijk (2013) ranging from 13 to 52 members, compiled by various international organisations 1 . The quotation in this section from Boto and Biasca hints strongly at a legitimacy deficit occasioned by the absence of definition 2 . While not attributing cause Von Tigerstrom (2005) documents the challenges faced by SIDS in their (to date unsuccessful) attempt at securing special and differential treatment (SDT) in the WTO based on their special vulnerabilities. Benjamin (2013) while supporting von Tigerstrom's opinion of WTO negotiations also points to successes SIDS have made in UNCLOS and UNFCCC negotiations pertaining to ocean governance.
More explicit references to the legitimacy issues of the SIDS have been advanced at least as early as 1980. Selwyn (1980) strongly suggested that the push for islands to be recognised as a special social or economic category was driven by many island governments wishing to likewise seek 'special privileges' that other categories of countries claimed. Campling (2006) while acknowledging that SIDS face structural constraints to development stemming from their permanent geographical isolation, advances views similar to those of Selwyn (1980) , claiming that "the emphasis of the SIDS concept has changed over time to reflect broader power relations in the global political economy" [Campling, (2006), p.268] . He presents an ethnographic overview of key institutional perspectives on SIDS. On one extreme SIDS are championed by UN agencies such as UNCTAD, on the other, orthodox neoliberal institutions -IMF and WTO do not formally acknowledge the constraints of small size. The World Bank (through the International Development Association -IDA) and the European Commission occupy the middle ground in terms of acceptance of SIDS. Interestingly he notes that among "some of the most important EU countries regarding overseas development aid (ODA), neither the UK, the Netherlands, France nor Germany recognise SIDS as a special grouping" (p.254).
Fialho and van Bergeijk acknowledge the formal acceptance of SIDS in the UN negotiating machinery as well as "the multiplication of SIDS-specific bureaucratic structures within the UN" (p.22). Despite this they conclude:
"The UN has not been able to agree on SIDS-specific SDT to be unanimously advocated among its main funds and agencies, let alone among its member states. Ironically, apart from the World Bank's small island exception and the EU-ACP agreement (which envisages special treatment for ACP countries that are SIDS), not much has been done within the UN to convert 'the recognition of SIDS-specific issues into (…) SIDS-specific concessions." (p.22) CaribInvest Ltd. et. al. (2012) lamented the lack of institutional mechanisms to support the SIDS global agenda contained in the Barbados programme of action and the Mauritius Strategy, this observation seems to persist to present with the SAMOA pathway. Further, it may be argued that in the current format, the effectiveness of SIDS in global negotiating theatres has been limited. For example, the impact of climate change is one the most challenging issues for SIDS, yet in the 2015 Paris agreement, issues which required immediate actions (from a SIDS perspective) such as financing and economic displacement were deferred. This begs the question therefore, would a more define SIDS group with more commonalities forge a powerful group akin to the G7?
The experience of SIDS in attaining their geopolitical objectives (the litmus test of legitimacy) has been mixed at best. The absence of definition we submit-like others before -is a fundamental reason for this. The largest 'recognised' group of SIDS -the UNOHRLLS lists (see Fialho and van Bergeijk) -is comprised of the 44 self-identified SIDS in AOSIS as well as eight other island dependencies. However, self-identification as a 'selection' criterion has limited definitional appeal and ultimately diminishes the group's legitimacy in global negotiating fora 3 . Failure to circumscribe to what is meant by 'small', 'island', or 'developing' -the key terms used, invites the possibility at least in theory of 'non bona-fide SIDS' hijacking the SIDS agenda or otherwise using this agenda to (attempt to): circumvent international obligations; or to access developmental aid which would have otherwise be a challenge to access. The now defunct Netherland Antilles has been excluded; *Denotes island that are not independent; *+ -territory of UK; *@ -territory of the USA; *;*^ -territory of France; +& -territory of The Netherlands. Source: UN-OHRLLS (2001) as sited in Fialho and Bergeijk (2013) , grouping done by authors according to AOSIS classification
A proposed approach to defining SIDS

Methodology and data
Overview
This paper assumes the approach that, countries which self-identify as SIDS may collectively have justified bases for such identification. We test this assumption, by determining whether the list of SIDS (see Table 1 ) collectively have distributions that are statistically distinct from other countries (as a group) over several germane variables. Where this assumption is justified (that is, the distributions are statistically distinct), we seek unique values for these variables beyond (to the left or to the right -depending on the relative position of the SIDS distribution) which the distributions statistically begin diverging from each other. This unique value, which we refer to as 'the point of demarcation' with respect to the specific variable (indicator). The definition(s) for SIDS is/are therefore set out directionally in relation to (some of) these demarcation points. We then seek to arrive at a definition that for example reads like: "SIDS are states that have values less than x 1 in respect of variable X 1 and values more than x 2 in respect of X 2 and ....".
Data
A four-dimensional framework (see Table 2 ) is applied in an attempt to define SIDS. The first three of these dimensions comprise of the geo-economic status and relate directly to the name SIDS, namely: small, island and development dimensions. The fourth dimension is the geo-impact status seeks to assess the extent to which socio-economic processes contribute to climate change 4 . Each dimension is associated with one or more concepts -from which indicators are identified.
Geo-economic status
Small (S): the two concepts employed to capture the dimension of smallness are size of internal markets and the extent of external dependence. These two concepts are recognised in the literature (cf. Briguglio, 1995; McGillivray et al., 2010; Guillaumont, 2010; Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998) . We use the average population (pop) and average purchasing power parity of GDP (GDP-PPP) as the indicators to measure the size of the internal market. Trade as percentage of GDP (trade) is used as the indicator to determine external dependence.
Island (I):
the island dimension is associated with three concepts. The first of these is the size of marine area relative to land area, this is measured by the coastline to land area ratio (CLR). The second is the importance of tourism receipts to the economy, this we measure by tourism receipts as a percent of total exports (TRE) 5 . The third is the extent to which coastal areas are used for human habitation, measured by the percent of the population living below five meters above sea level (PB5).
Developing (D)
: the average income level is the concept we associate with the development dimension of which the GDP-PPP per capita (GPC) is used as an indicator of this concept 6 .
Geo-impact status
Geo-impact: the geo-impact dimension is captured by the concept of the carbon footprint of socio-economic processes, measured by two indicators. These are energy use per $1,000 of GDP (EPG) and energy use per capita (EPC). Table 2 summarises the foregoing as well as presenting examples of where these concepts and indicators were previously used in the literature. The 214 countries/states represented in the World Bank open data database (WBOD) are dichotomised into SIDS and rest of the world (ROW) using the UN-SIDS classification (Table 1) 7 . The UN-SIDS list was used because it is one of the most universally accepted list in the diplomatic, economic and political fora. For each indicator (except the CLR), available data in the WBOD between 1990 and 2013 are collated and cross sectional means calculated 8 . Table 3 shows the countries for which at least one of the above indicators is unavailable. The table also shows in each case the indicators (variables) that are unavailable. Table 3 States and indicators with missing data Step 1 Identify the value -v i of the i th percentile in the ROW distribution ∀i = 1, 2, 3,…99.
States
GDP-PPP Pop Trade GPC CLR TRE PB5 EGDP EPC
Step 2 Run the KS test for the equality of the SIDS and ROW distributions for (combined) values of X (denoted as x) such that x ≤ v 99-j for successive values of j(j = 0, 1, 2,…98) until the test statistically fails to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the two distributions (that is p-value > 0.1) 11 . Panel A in Figure 1 illustrates this approach.
Step 3 The v i ≡ v 99-j where the p-value of the KS test first exceeds 10% is referred to as v* -the point of demarcation. The point of demarcation essentially is the value of X (v*) where, if only values less than or equal to it were considered, the ROW distribution will be statically indistinguishable from the UN-SIDS distribution. It was therefore the inclusion of values in excess of v* that would have previously allowed these two distribution to be statistically distinguishable from each other
12
. In this sense v* becomes a critical value of sorts.
For the variable X, if the ROW distribution is to the left of the SIDS distribution (and statistically different from it) then step 2 above is replaced by 13 :
Step ii Run the KS test for the equality of the SIDS and ROW distributions for combined values of X (denoted as x) such that x ≤ v 99-j for successive values of j(j = 98, 97, 96,…0) until the test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the two distributions (that is p-value > 0.1). Panel B of Figure 1 graphically illustrates this approach.
Where the ROW distribution is to the right of the SIDS distribution (that is the SIDS distribution is to the left), countries corresponding to x ≤ v* are considered to be SIDS-like with respect to (w.r.t) variable X. While countries corresponding to x > v* are considered to be SIDS-unlike w.r.t the variable (X) in question 14 . Where the ROW distribution is to the left (SIDS to the right), countries corresponding to x < v* are considered to be SIDS-unlike w.r.t variable X; countries corresponding to x ≥ v* are considered as being SIDS-like w.r.t variable X.
A country's degree of SIDS-likeness/unlikeness is simply the count of SIDS-likes /SIDS-unlikes within a given dimension. Where the recursive procedure is unable to yield a value -v*, then all SIDS are considered to be SIDS-like and all ROW to be SIDS-unlike. One should note that the application of the above procedure, is our attempt to identify all states that are statistically similar to the majority of self-identified SIDS, while simultaneously identifying among the self-identified SIDS, those countries that are dissimilar to the majority of countries in the group. This procedure therefore uses information about self-identified SIDS as a group to create (for each indicator) the criterion that could (should) be used to demarcate the 'real SIDS' from other countries.
Results
Across all the indicators (variables) applied in this study, the results show that the SIDS distributions are statistically different from the ROW distributions except for GDP-per capita. Summaries of these distributions are presented below. Also presented are the demarcation points for each indicator (as generated from the recursive KS test) and the list for each indicator of SIDS-like ROW countries and the list of SID-unlikes amongst the self-identified SIDS/UN-SIDS (Table 1) .
Small dimension
First, Table 4 shows that with respect to Real GDP, the ROW distribution is the right of the SIDS distribution with 75% of SIDS having economies that are smaller than the lowest 25% of ROW. Second, the application of the recursive KS test procedure attained a demarcation point of GDP of 1.79 billion PPP dollars, equivalent to the 11th percentile of combined GDP distribution 15 . Third, economies with an average GDP less than or equal to this, are considered are considered SIDS-like w.r.t. GDP and those with GDP greater than this are considered SIDS-unlike w.r.t. GDP. Forth, using this demarcation, we found that 18 of UN-SIDS countries are SIDS-unlike w.r.t. GDP 16 . While Djibouti and Liberia were the only SIDS-like non-SIDS (ROW) found. Table 5 shows that in terms of population size, the ROW distribution is shifted to the right of that of SIDS. More than half of the UN-SIDS countries have populations that are smaller than, the lower 10% of the ROW distribution. The application of the recursive KS test, a demarcation point of 1.9 million persons, equivalent to the 33rd percentile of the combined population distribution was established 17 . Using this demarcation point, seven UN-SIDS countries returned as SIDS-unlike w.r.t. population as their average population exceeded 1.9 million inhabitants. These countries are Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, Puerto Rico and Singapore. A total of 32 ROW countries are considered as SIDS-like w.r.t. population 18 . In terms of trade dependency, Figure 2 shows that trade dependency (trade to GDP ratio) is generally higher in SIDS compare to the ROW. A demarcation point of 68.5% has been established with the application of the recursive procedure. Seven UN-SIDS countries have trade intensities that are below this benchmark and hence are classified as SIDS-unlike w.r.t trade, these countries are: Comoros, Cuba, French Polynesia, Guinea-Bissau, New Caledonia and Suriname. Some 87 ROW countries are classified as SIDS-like w.r.t trade using this benchmark 19 . Table 6 shows SIDS-like ROW countries and SIDS-unlike UN-SIDS countries and their associated degree of likeness/ unlikeness in respect of the small dimension. Recall that a country's degree of SIDS-likeness/unlikeness is just the count of the number of times it satisfies the indicator benchmarks as established above. The UN-SIDS countries not listed in column C, are SIDS-like in at least two of a maximum of three degrees, or satisfied all the SIDS-like benchmark criteria for all (their) available indicators. Similarly, ROW countries not listed in column B are SIDS-unlike in at least two to a possible three degrees or have satisfied all the SIDS-unlike criteria for all (their) available indicators.
a We propose that countries are defined as small if they satisfy half or more of the relevant criteria (based on available data) listed below: 1 GDP-PPP that on average is less than or equal to the 11th percentile (of the world distribution). 2 Population that on average is less than or equal to the 33rd percentile (of the world distribution. 3 Trade dependency (trade to GDP) ratio that is on average greater than or equal to 68.5%.
Therefore, all UN-SIDS not having a degree of SIDS-unlikeness of two or more are considered as SIDS-like in the small dimension 20 . Also considered SIDS-like in the small dimension are ROW countries that are SIDS-like to a degree of (at least) two or to a degree of one if one or more indicators are missing. Table 7 shows summaries of the coast length to land area ratio (CLR) distributions, as expected, the UN-SIDS distribution is shifted to the right of the ROW distribution (ROW is to the left of UN-SIDS). A value of 0.03 had been identified as the demarcation point. Belize, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Papua New Guinea and Suriname were identified as self-identified SIDS violating the CLR benchmark (that is CLR < 0.03). Some 28 ROW states were classified as SIDS-like in that they exceed the 0.03 CLR benchmark 21 . Figure 3 , shows that the ROW distribution of tourism receipts to total exports (TRE) is shifted to the left of that for the UN-SIDS. The TRE benchmark was estimated at 31.3%. The following 12 self-identified SIDS fell short of this benchmark: Aruba, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste and Trinidad and Tobago 22 . There were eight SIDS-like ROW w.r.t. TRE, which are: Albania, Croatia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Macao (SAR, China), Montenegro, Morocco and Rwanda. Deducing from Figure 4 , it is evident that typically UN-SIDS have a greater percentage of their population living in low lying areas than the ROW countries. Based on the recursive KS test, countries with less than 7.2% of the population living below five meters above sea level are considered SIDS-unlike with respect to this indicator, the converse being considered SIDS-like. There are six self-identified SIDS that are SIDS-unlike when the above criterion was applied. These are: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste. A total of 49 ROW Countries are deemed SIDS-like in this regard 23 .
Island dimension
b We propose that countries are defined as having a critical degree of islandness if they satisfy half or more of the relevant criteria (based on available data) listed below: 1 coastline to land ratio (CLR) of greater than or equal to 0.03 2 tourism receipts to total exports (TRE) that is greater than or equal to 32.3% 3 7.2 % or more of the population living below five meters (above sea level). Table 8 summarises for ROW and UN-SIDS, the degree of SIDS-likeness and unlikeness respectively w.r.t to the island dimension. Similar to Table 6 , UN-SIDS displaying a degree of SIDS-unlikeness of one or less is considered SIDS-like (and consequently is not shown). ROW countries with two or more degrees of SIDS-likeness are classified as being SIDS-like w.r.t the island dimension, as are those with one degree and missing observations for the other two indicators.
Table 8
Degree of SIDS-likeness and unlikeness (island dimension)
Degree of SIDS-likeness/ unlikeness (A) SIDS-like (ROW) (B) SIDS-unlike (UN-SIDS) (C)
Island dimension 
Geo-impact dimension
In terms of the Geo-impact, Figure 5 shows that typically economic processes in the UN-SIDS require less energy to produce a unit of GDP than those in ROW countries. The demarcation point was established at a ratio of 76.8 kgs of oil used per $1,000 of GDP (PPP) produced. Twenty-five self-identified SIDS are SIDS-unlike w.r.t. using this indicator variable 24 . Thirteen ROW were identified as SIDS-like w.r.t their energy to GDP conversion 25 . c We propose that states are defined as having low geo-impact if they satisfy all of the relevant criteria (based on available data) listed below: 1 average energy per $1,000 of GDP (EPG) is equal to or less than 76.8 kgs 2 average EPC of 7,849 kgs or less. Table 9 summaries for ROW and UN-SIDS the degree of SIDS-likeness and unlikeness respectively. 
SIDS: proposed definitions
In view of the above findings, we propose a revisit of what it means to be SIDS. In this regard and using the three definitions outlined above we propose a strict and a relaxed definition of SIDS . In formulating these, we posit that the most critical dimension of SIDS as a geo-political construct is the notion of islandness, therefore it is the central element in both definitions. We propose:
1 Strict definition: SIDS are states possessing a critical degree of islandness that are also small and have low geo-impact; where these result in a unique combination of development challenges and opportunities 26 .
Applying this strict definition, a total of 18 self-identified SIDS satisfy this definition 27 as shown as group A in Figure 7 . Available data does not suggest that there any ROW country which satisfies this definition 28 . Of the 18 self-identified SIDS, six are from the Caribbean, eight from the Pacific and three from the Africa, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean region.
2 Relaxed definition: SIDS are states possessing a critical degree of islandness and that either: are small, have low geo-impact or both; where these qualities result in a peculiar combinations of development challenges and opportunities 29 .
Application of this relaxed definition therefore means that a total of 51 states are considered SIDS, which are represented as groups A and B in Figure 7 as well as groups A and B in Figure 8 . This also means that a total of 11 self-identified SIDS fail to meet the criteria of the relaxed definition. 
Conclusions
The absence of a definition for the category has been recognised as a significant hindrance to the legitimacy of SIDS. Further, this absence of definition has in part hampered the realisation of key concessions, pursued by the group in international fora. This paper advances a technical approach that may be employed in seeking this definition. Its main contribution in this regard is an easily implemented statistical procedure that endogenously generates demarcation points for conceptually relevant indicators that may be used to set explicit criteria for SIDS classification. Additionally, the paper proposed relevant concepts and associated indicators emanating from four dimensions pertinent to the SIDS construct. Based on these, it advances strict and relaxed definitions of SIDS with associated lists.
One possible consequence of attempting to define a group of things (especially after objects have been subjectively perceived as belonging or not belong to it) is that there is an inherent risk of classify an item that was previously believed to be belonging to this group as not belonging. Another consequence is the risk inherent in the converse. While these risks are well understood, the authors consider the potential benefits to be had in terms of advancing the legitimacy of the SIDS agenda, make this debate on definitional issues worthwhile.
Disclaimer
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Notes
1
According to Fialho and van Bergeijk (2013, p.21 ) the "more inclusive of these SIDS lists is the one advocated by the UN -Office of the High Representative for LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS (UN-OHRLLS), with 52 countries, including indisputably not-so-small islands and non-independent territories. The World Bank's list of SIDS is the least inclusive, while UNCTAD 'unofficial' list of SIDS excludes non-independent territories as well as bigger islands and coastal/continental countries considered by the UN-OHRLLS, UNDESA, UNESCO and AOSIS". 2 We use the term legitimacy in the sense used by Hurd (1999, P.381) as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed". We obviously slightly modify this to be the normative belief by an actor than organisation's claim to special privileges ought to be taken seriously. Legitimacy is important in international relations as an organisation that is deemed as legitimate by an actor "is in a position of power over the actor, but it is power in a broader sense (that is authority) rather than the coercive power of the bully" (p.400). 3
Notwithstanding this, a strong rationale exists for some countries (at least) to prefer self-identification as opposed to an explicit definition of SIDS. Each self-identified SIDS faces a non-zero probability of failing a -still to be determined -definitional criteria. It is reasonable to assume that the expected pay-off for each surviving SIDS (those who pass the definitional criteria) is higher if legitimacy is improved through adoption and application of a definition. However, for those that failed to maintain their SIDS status, they not only lose this potentially higher pay-off but also their lower current pay-off (associated with being a self-identified SIDS). If a country perceives that its risk of failure is sufficiently high, the status-quo of self-identification may be preferred over definition even when total expected pay-off (associated with definition) is greater for the SIDS group in aggregate. 4
Climate change is an issue that has galvanised SIDS to press for greater action because of the perception that they are among the group of countries with the most to lose as a consequence of rising global temperatures, rising sea levels and climate variability. The moral strength of this argument would be bolstered if they (SIDS) can prove that not only are they expected to bear a disproportionate share of the cost but that they did relatively little to contribute to the phenomenon. 5 "It is known that small islands states tend to depend on tourism more than larger states do … The reason for this could be associated with the comparative advantage that islands tend to have in tourism-related activities" [Briguglio and Briguglio, (n.d), p.1] . This comparative advantage seems to stem from the fact that much of the world's tourism product is dependent on coastal resources (cf. UNEP, 2009).
6
Averages such as GDP per capita, have obvious limitations as measure of development as they mask important information about income inequality and the incidence of poverty, both of which in some SIDS (for which data is available) can be quite high. Another possible indicator is the HDI scores, this was not used is because it is still highly correlated with GDP per capita (therefore it is expected to yield similar results) and it is not available for a number of states in the data set. 7
Not all states listed in Table 1 are reflected the WBOD, those not reflected are: Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Nauru and Niue. 8
The data for CLR is calculated based on land area and coastline data from the 2013-4 CIA World Factbook available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 9
For those wanting to further explore the KS test, Conover (1999) is an excellent starting point. 10 If the distributions are not statistically different from each other no further analysis is conducted for that variable. 11 We use the p-value of the combined corrected K-S statistic. Estimations were done using the STATA statistical software. 12 In the case where the ROW is to the left of the SIDS distribution the intuition is similar with the signs reversed. 13 The intuition behind would have changed, see footnote 12. 14 Relatively more SIDS observations are expected to be contained in lower centiles of the combined distribution than ROW observations. Therefore, as we move in a leftward direction, the combined distribution becomes more dominated by SIDS observations in a relative sensethat is the number of observations relative to their respective total count. ROW countries whose values of X are less than or equal to v* are distributionally similar to SIDS falling within the same range. Further these ROW observations are located in a region of the combined distribution that is dominated in a relative sense by SIDS observations. It is in this sense these observations are called 'SIDS-like'. 15 Since GDP is known to be non-mean reverting over significant periods of time, we will use
